Berbagai studi sebelumnya telah melakukan penelitian empiris mengenai bank risk taking. Dalam penelitian-peneltian tersebut, diperoleh kesimpulan bahwa bank risk taking dipengaruhi oleh berbagai faktor antara lain charter value (Keeley, 1990, Galloway, 1997), adanya penjaminan simpanan (Wheelock, 1992, Karels dan Mc Clatchey, 1999, Hueyie dan Lie, 2003), capital regulation (Jacques dan Nigro, 1997, Rime 2001), ownership structure (Saunders, 1990, Chen, 1998, Park dan Peristiani 1998). Penulis tertarik untuk melakukan penelitian empiris serupa dengan mengambil objek perbankan di Indonesia dari tahun 1995 s.d. 2005. Telah diketahui bahwa perbankan di Indonesia telah mengalami berbagai macam perubahan kebijakan, termasuk telah mengalami berbagai kondisi seperti krisis perbankan yang terjadi pada tahun 1997/1998, antara lain implementasi program penjaminan simpanan dalam bentuk blanket guarantee scheme yang dimulai sejak tahun 1998, dan regulasi kecukupan modal minimum (Capital Adequacy Requirement) yang telah berubah beberapa kali yaitu sebesar 8% pada tahun 1995 s.d 1997 kemudian diturunkan menjadi 4% pada tahun 1998 s.d. 2000 kemudian kembali menjadi 8% sejak tahun 2001 s.d. 2005. Dengan menggunakan uji beda dan analisis regresi diperoleh hasil bahwa pada perbankan di Indonesia adanya implementasi program penjaminan simpanan menimbulkan bank moral hazard khususnya untuk risiko kredit, sementara regulasi pemerintah mengenai kecukupan modal minimum belum terbukti menimbulkan bank moral hazard.

Several researchers have done empirical researches about bank risk taking. Their research has been concluded that bank risk taking affected by several factor such as charter value (Keeley, 1990, Galloway, 1997), deposit insurance (Wheelock, 1992, Karels dan Mc Clatchey, 1999, Hueyie and Lie, 2003), capital regulation (Jacques and Nigro, 1997, Rime 2001), ownership structure (Saunders, 1990, Chen, 1998, Park and Peristiani 1998). The writer has interested to do same empirical research with Indonesian Banks during 1995 to. 2005 as the object of the research. As known that Indonesian banking industry has been follow a lot of regulation changes, including banking crisis condition in 1997/1998, such as implementation of deposit insurance whose known as blanket guarantee scheme which began from 1998, and regulation of capital adequacy requirement which has been changed several times, about 8% during 1995 to 1997, than has been decreased to 4% during 1998 to 2000 and has been increased back to 8% during 2001 to 2005. Using difference statistical test and regression analysis resulted that there’s moral hazard in Indonesian banks during implementation of deposit insurance, especially for credit risk. Over there, the research can’t proof that government regulation about capital adequacy requirement cause moral hazard.

Kata Kunci : bank risk taking, penjaminan simpanan, blanket guarantee scheme, kecukupan modal, moral hazard, deposit insurance, Capital adequacy requirement